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1 Introduction
The régulation of industries where consumers are willing to pay higher
priées for higher qualities takes often the form of minimum quality stan
dards (MQSs). aiming at increasing social welfare through an increase in
the average quality supplied in those industries. The rationale behind thèse
interventions is that governments, either for paternalistic reasons or for the
récognition of the présence of externalities, believe that the qualities offe-
red by firms are too low (for a more detailed discussion, see Viscusi et al.
(1995)).
In the case of oligopoliste markets, three main issues hâve been dealt
with so far, namely (i) the introduction of MQSs and its conséquences on
market structure in a duopoly where quality improvements involve a fixed
cost technology (Ronnen (1991), Constantatos and Perrakis (1998), and
Scarpa (1998)); (ii) the introduction of an MQS and its long-run compéti
tive effects in a duopoly where quality improvements are obtained through
an increase in variable costs, under full market coverage (Crampes and Hol-
lander (1995), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997)); (iii) the effects of MQSs in
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an open economy with intraindustry trade (Motta and Thisse (1993), Boom
(1995), Lutz (2000)).
In the aforeraentioned literature, the optimal MQS policy has been
studied under the assumption that firms play à la Nash, which can be
interpreted as a situation where firms are symmetric in terms of their rela
tive market power. However, in many real-world oligopolistic markets, some
firms enjoy dominant positions over competitors, either because of the past
history of those markets, or because of endogenous stratégie interaction.
This poses two questions which we want to address in this paper. The first
can be formulated as follows. What are the conséquences of the introduction
of an MQS on the distribution of market power across firms ? This refers to
a situation where the MQS may modify a status quo where a firm enjoys
a dominant position. The second question is whether the regulator is able
to increase social welfare through an MQS, irrespective of the endogenous
distribution of market power across firms. Answering both questions could
help to shed some new light on the effectiveness of the MQS as a policy
instrument.
In order to address thèse issues, we model a vertically differentiated
duopoly where we investigate the interplay between a regulator, choosing
the MQS, and firms. choosing endogenously the timing of their respective
moves. We adopt a two-stage model where firms set qualities in the first
stage, and priées in the second, and ail consumers in the market are served.
We describe the endogenous timing of moves with respect to the choice of
quality, that is, the outeomes generated by Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
in the first stage of the game.1 This aspect summarises the possibility that
firms hâve différent market positions. As a benchmark, we initially study
the equilibrium outeome characterising the unregulated market. Then, we
introduce the problem of the regulator in setting the optimal MQS under
endogenous timing.
In modelling the issue of endogenous timing, we follow d'Aspremont
and Gérard-Varet (1980) and Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). They hâve
shown that firms move sequentially whenever there exists at least one Stac
kelberg equilibrium which Pareto-dominates ail the Nash equilibria. Other-
wise, firms always play simultaneously. The intuition behind this resuit is as
follows. Consider a one-shot duopoly game where firms can choose whether
to move at the same time or scatter their respective décisions. If they décide
to move simultaneously, no matter whether early or late, a Nash equilibrium
obtains. If, conversely, they move sequentially, then a Stackelberg equili
brium is observed. The necessary condition for a Stackelberg equilibrium
to obtain is that the leader's profits be higher than the Nash equilibrium
profits. Otherwise, no firm would be willing to move first. Then, suppose
that the follower's profits are lower than the Nash profits. If so, both firms
décide to move at the same time in order to avoid playing the follower's
1 The issue of choosing between Nash and Stackelberg equilibria has received a wide attention in oligopoly
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rôle. The sufficient condition for firms to play sequentially, generating thns
a Stackelberg equilibrium, is that both the leader's and the follower's profits
are at least as high as the Nash profits.
Our main fmelings can be stated as follows. First, the timing game
in the quality space lias a unique equilibrium in pure stratégies, involving
simultaneous moves. The relatcd optimal MQS is time consistent, although
suboptimal from the viewpoint of the regulator. There exists, however, the
possibility for the regulator to implement an optimal but time inconsistent
policy driving firms towards a Stackelberg outeome witli the high-quality
firm in the leader's rôle. Second, we prove that, when the low-quality firm
is Stackelberg leader in the quality stage, the related MQS is ineffective. In
summary, the MQS does not affect the relative market positions of firms,
unless the regulator is time incoiisistent. However, there exists a situation
vvhere the MQS cannot be used as a policy tool, namely, the setting where
the low-quality firm lias a dominant position. In this case, the ineffectiveness
of the MQS is due to the fact that the low-quality firm aims at serving
the average consumer, thus creating an upward bias in the average quality
supplied in the market.
The paper is structured as follows. The duopoly model is laid out in
section 2. whercas the unregulated market setting is presented in section 3.
The optimal MQSs are derived in section 4. Concluding comments are in
section 5.
2 The basic duopoly model
Hère we describe a inodel of unregulated duopoly under complète infor
mation, presented in several contributions (Moorthy (1988), Cremer and
Thisse (1994), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Lambertini (1996), Ecchia
and Lambertini (1997)). Each firm i € {H,L} produces a vertically diffe-
rentiated good characterised by quality qt, with qn ^ Ql, and then compete
in priées against the rival. There exists a continuum of consumers indexed
by their marginal willingness to pay for quality 9 € [6q, 6>i], with 0O = Qx - 1.
The distribution of consumers is uniform, with density f(0) = 1, so that
the total mass of consumers is also 1. We assume full market coverage, that
is, each consumer buys one unit of the product that yields the highest net
surplus U = Oq — p. Production technology involves variable costs, which
are convex in the quality level and linear in the output level : 2
d = qfxi i = H,L (1)
The previous spécification of the cost function lias relevant implica
tions as to the effects of a quality standard on market structure. In the
Altematively, quality improvements could hinge upon fixed costs, representing R&D efforts. This cost function
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remainder, we will see that the risk of exit by the low-quality fîrm as a con
séquence of the introduction of a standard, which exists under fixed costs of
quality improvements (Ronnen (1991), Constantatos and Perrakis (1998),
Scarpa (1998)), is completely absent in the présent setting. Firm ïs profit
function is
*i = (Pi ~ QÏ)Xi (2)
Compétition between firms is fully noncooperative and takes place
in two stages. In the first, firms set their respective quality levels; then, in
the second, which is the proper market stage, they compete in priées. The
solution concept applied is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward
induction.
3 The unregulated duopoly
In this section, we consider the setting without minimum quality standard.
Given generic priées and qualities, the "location" of the consumer indiffèrent
between the two varieties is h = {pn — Pl)/{qh — <Zl)> so that market
demands are xh — B\—h and xl = h — (0i — 1).
Consumer surplus in the two market segments is defined as follows :
f
Qq CSL = f (BqL - pL)dB\ CSH= r (9qH - Ph)M; (3)
JQq Jh
social welfare corresponds to the sum of consumer surplus and firms1 profits,
SW = CSH + CSL + TTtf + 7TL.
As a benchmark, consider first the situation where qualities are chosen
simultaneously. As this situation has been widely analysed in the literature
(Cremer and Thisse (1994), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Ecchia and
Lambertini (1997)), we can briefly summarise it. Prom the first order con




Substituting and rearranging, we get the profit functions defined exclusively
in terms of qualities, tt^çhjÇl)- The subgame perfect quality levels are
4*1 + 1 40!-5
Qh = £—; Ql = ^ , (5)
o o
which entails the gênerai constraint 6\ ^ 9/4, in order for the poorest consu
mer to be in a position to buy the low-quality product. The corresponding
equilibrium profits are 7r$ = n^ = 3/16, and equilibrium demands areGiulio Ecchia, Luca Lambertini 123
xh = xl = 1/2 (superscript Ar indicates that both stages are played simul-
taneously). The welfare level is SW{N) = (160? - 16<9j + l)/64. Consumer
surplus in each segment of the market is CSh = (160? - 80i - 27)/128; and
CSL = (160? - 24(9i - 19)/128. Observe that the socially preferred quali-
ties would be the first and third quartiles of the interval [(0i - 1) /2,0i/2],
which obtains from the calculation of the preferred varieties for the richest
and the poorest consumer in the market, if such varieties were sold at mar
ginal cost. This implies that (i) qualities are set, respectively, too low and
too high as compared to the social optimum.3;and (ii) this model shares
its gênerai features with the model of spatial compétition with quadratic
transportation costs4
3.1 Quality leadership
We consider now the situation of quality leadership, i.e., the case where
the quality stage is played sequentially, while the price stage is played si-
multaneously. Equilibrium priées at the market stage are defined by (4).
We consider first the case where the high-quality firm is leader, solving the
following problem :
max 7TH = {ph - q2H)xH (6)
9
Equilibrium qualities are qlH = (20i — l)/4 and ç£ = (20i — 3)/4. where
superscripts l and / stand for quality leader and quality follower, respec
tively. Equilibrium profits and outputs are, respectively, tt1h = 2/9 and
?r{ = 1/18; x// = 2/3 and xl = 1/3. The corresponding level of social wel-
fare is SW(Hl) = (360? - 360i + 5)/144. The condition ensuring that the
poorest consumer is served is 6\ ^ 2.21375.
If the low-quality firm is the leader, lier problem consists in
max txl = (pL - q\)xL (8)
- qL + 20! + 1 = Q (9)
dqH ~ 9
3 In duopoly, socially optimal qualities are (see Cremer and Thisse (1994)) :
m 40, -1 + 40, -3
Qh = 8 : QL = 8
which are, respectively, lower and higher than q^ and m, in (5).
4 It can be shown that the spatial model with quadratic transportation costs is actually a spécial case of a
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The resulting equilibrium qualities are qfj = (2#i + l)/4 and qlL = (26i —
l)/4. The condition ensuring that the poorest consumer is served is 6\ ^
2.25831. Due to the symmetry of the model, equilibrium profits and outputs
are nlL = 2/9 and tï*h = 1/18; xl = 2/3 and xh = 1/3. The corresponding
level of social welfare is SW(Ll) = (3661? - 360i + 5)/144.
In both cases, the quality leader locates in the middle of the interval
of socially preferred qualities, defined by [(0i — l)/2,#i/2], i.e., the leader
produces the quality preferred by the médian (and average) consumer. In
relation to this, it is worth stressing that when the low-quality firm leads,
the average quality is higher than in ail other cases, and this will hâve some
relevant bearings on the possibility of regulating such a market through an
MQS.
3.2 Endogenous timing
Hère, we confine our analysis to the range of 6\ wherein ail the equilibria
described above are admissible, i.e., 0\ ^ 2.25831. The relevant profits are














Playing early (F) is a strictly dominant strategy for both firms, so that this
game has a unique equilibrium, (F, F) (see Lambertini (1996)).
Remark 1 The firms ' timing décisions always yield simultaneous moves.
4 The regulated duopoly
In this section, we explicitly calculate the optimal levels of the MQS, as well
as their conséquences on the relevant equilibrium magnitudes. We consider
the following game structure. In each of the following games5, the policy
5 As it will becoms clear In the remainder, the condition 9\ ^ 2.25831, ensuring full market coverage in the
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maker sets the optimal MQS mimicking to be in control of the low-quality
firm at the quality stage, while firm L continues to set her price according
to (4).
4.1 Simultaneous moves
The dérivation of the optimal MQS when qualities are chosen simultaneously
coincides with the analysis presented in Ecchia and Lambertini (1997). The
resulting MQS is
Superscript 5 dénotes the présence of a minimum quality standard. Given
qf and its equilibrium price, full market coverage is possible if and only if
0i ^ 2.23926. Observe that the introduction of the standard slightly loosens
such a constraint as compared to the unregulated setting. The new level of
the high quality is the best reply of the high-quality firm to the MQS :
s 20fli
40
The new equilibrium profits are
?r£ = 0.22153; iïsh = 0.06714 (12)
As a resuit of the adoption of the MQS, the degree of differentiation de-
creases (since both qualities increases, but the reaction of the high quality
is weaker) and the demand for the high quality decreases while the demand
for the low quality increases. This produces an increase in the low-quality
firm's profits, and a réduction in the high-quality firm's profits (as in Ron-
nen (1991), and Crampes and Hollander (1995)). The net effect is négative,
so that total industry profits are considerably decreased as compared to the
unregulated equilibrium.
Social welfare amoimts to SWS(N) = [2OO0i(0i-l) + 18\/6-13]/8OO,
which is obviously higher than that observed in the unregulated setting.
The increase in welfare is due to two effects : (i) the increase in both qua
lity levels; (ii) the increase in price compétition, due to a reduced degree of
product differentiation. However, the effect of the MQS on consumer sur
plus is not identical across consumers. The MQS increases the surplus of
consumers purchasing the low quality for ail acceptable values of 9\, while
it decreases the surplus of consumers patronizing the high quality if 9\ is
sufficiently high. Summing up. in this case it appears that the MQS policy,
provided it is designed to maximize welfare regardless of its redistributive
effects, trades off the losses suffered by the agents (firm and consumers)
dealing with the high quality with the gains enjoyed by the other agents.126 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 67(2), 2001
4.2 Quality leadership
Assume the price stage is simultaneous, equilibrium priées being given by
(4). When qualities are chosen sequentially, two alternative cases arise. In
the first, the high-quality firm is the leader. If so, the high-quality firm
maximises profits under the constraint that the regulator chooses the MQS
in order to maximise social welfare. In the second, the low-quality firm would
lead : this implies that, in setting the MQS, the regulator maximises social
welfare, taking into account the high-quality firm's best reply.
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By checking the second order conditions, it is possible to verify that the
regulator's best reply is given by the larger of the two solutions in (14). As
a resuit, solving the leader's problem yields
qsHl = ^- + 0.068811 ; qff = ?± - 0.337644 (16)
Zi Zt
Notice that qV > q(, so that the MQS is binding. Obviously, equilibrium
qualities are acceptable if the consumer at $o is able to buy, Le., (0i — l)qL —
psLf ^ 0. This entails 0X ^ 2.0206. Equilibrium profits are tt^ = 0.072662
and 7rf7 = 0.135004. Output levels are xH = 0.423178 and xL = 0.576822.
Social welfare amounts to SWs(Hl) = 0.064768 + 0i(0i - l)/4.
Case B : firm L leader. This amounts to consider the case where
the regulator is the leader at the quality stage. He aims at
max SW = CSH + CSL -\-tth + ^l (17)
=Q
The solutions to (18) are qu = 1 + 0\ - qh, and qH = (1 + l?i + <?l)/3.
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acceptable solution is the second. Solving the problem of the regulator as a
leader, we get the equilibrium quality levels :
Si _ 406>i - 65 + 3y/Ï45 Sf _ 4001 + 5 - y/Î45
Ql ~ 80 '' Qh ~ 80 ( j
The above qualities are acceptable if the poorest consumer is able to buy :
this implies 0X ^ 2.22258. Equilibrium profits are trsHs = 0.0840355 and
?rf = 0.218755. Output levels are xH = 0.38264 and xL = 0.61736. So
cial welfare amounts to SWs{Lql) = 0.0406608 + 0i(0i - l)/4. Notice that
SWs{Ll) > SW(Ll). However. çf < qlL, i.e., the standard is not binding.
In the case where the low-quality firm leads, it would be socially désirable
to decrease both quality levels. Yet, this cannot be achieved through a mini
mum quality standard, as the standard is not binding. We hâve thus proved
the following lemma :
Lemma 1 When the low-quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage, the
MQS policy cannot improve social welfare.
Therefore, the MQS will not be adopted and the relevant payoffs for
firms are those of the unregulated equilibrium.
Before investigating the issue of endogenous timing in the présence of
a standard, it is worth stressing a few relevant results emerging from the
analysis carried out so far :
Proposition 1 Under variable costs of quality improvements,
• both firnis survive in equilibrium after the introduction of the MQS;
• in the regulated equilibria, the low-quality (high-quality) firm 's profits are
at least (most) as high as in the corresponding unregulated equilibria;
• in the regulated equilibria, the low-quality firm 's profits are always larger
than the high-quality firm 's profits.
The first claim in the above proposition is in contrast with the con
clusions reached in models where quality is the outcome of R&D activity
(Ronnen (1991), Constantatos and Perrakis (1998), Scarpa (1998)), where
introducing an MQS may bring about an undesirable increase in concentra
tion. In our setting. the MQS never induces exit, as fixed costs are assumed
away. The second claim states that the low-quality firm always benefits from
the MQS, the only exception being the case where the same firm is quality
leader. The intuition behind this is that the adoption of the MQS improves
the position of the low-quality firm in the market (Crampes and Hollander
(1995), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997)); if she is already acting as a leader
in the product stage, then the MQS cannot increase her profits. The third
statement establishes that it is optimal for the regulator to increase the
market power of the low-quality firm up to a point where it is no longer
convenient to be the high-quality seller.128 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 67(2), 2001
4.3 Endogenous timing
Consider now the choice of timing w.r.t. to quality. In this case, the regulator
needs to anticipate firms' timing décisions in order to set the minimum
quality standard. We establish the following
Proposition 2 The timing game in the quality space has a unique equili-
brium in pure stratégies, which entails simultaneous play.








On the basis of lemma 1, we know that the MQS cannot be used by
the regulator under the leadership of the low-quality firm. Hence, the payoffs
in the south-west cell of matrix II are given by firms' unregulated profits.
It is immédiate to check that, since for both firms playing F is a dominant
strategy, the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the game is (F, F). a
As a corollary to remark 1 and proposition 2, we hâve
Corollary 1 The firms ' choice of timing is unaffected by régulation.
As a conséquence, we expect the regulator to introduce the MQS which
is optimal under simultaneous moves. This produces the following relevant
corollary :
Corollary 2 The MQS qf is suboptimal from the regulator's standpoint.
This follows immediately from the inequalities
SWs(Hl) > SWS{N) > SWs{Ll)
Observe that there exists the possibility for the regulator to drive firms
to {F, S), i.e., the situation where the high-quality firm takes the lead. To
see this, notice that qL > ç£, that is, the optimal MQS under high-quality
leadership is larger than the optimal MQS under simultaneous moves. This
implies that the regulator can adopt qff, inducing the high-quality firm
to play the leader's rôle because she finds it convenient to do so. However,
this policy is optimal from the regulator's standpoint, but time inconsistent.
A simple proof consists in checking that forward induction and backward
induction do not coïncide in this case. Consider first the backward inductionGiulio Ecchia, Luca Lambertini 129
argument. This leads to simultaneous play on the part of firms, based on
matrix II. Then, the regulator should set the MQS equal to q£, taking
the timing (F, F) as given. Now, examine the forward induction argument.
The regulator adopts qL*', driving firms towards (F, S). Hence, the two
arguments are not consistent.
5 Concluding remarks
In the foregoing analysis, we hâve investigated the régulation through MQSs
of a vertically differentiated duopoly where the timing of moves is endoge-
nously chosen by firms. As a first and gênerai resuit we hâve established
that, in the présent setting, the MQS involves no decrease in the intensity
of compétition and always favours the low-quality firm.
Concerning the timing of quality décisions, we hâve shown that the
game has a unique equilibrium in pure stratégies and the optimal MQS is
time consistent when the policy maker takes firms' timing choice as given.
However, the resulting equilibrium is socially suboptimal.
The previous analysis has addressed the issue of time consistency of
regulatory policy in an oligopoly market. In this respect, we hâve shown
that, whenever the décision to regulate an industry is taken, we need to
evaluate the potential impact of regulatory measures on the structure of the
oligopolistic game between firms. Our model indicates that the intervention
of the regulator distorts the stratégie interaction of firms in determining
the endogenous distribution of rôles, only if the regulator adopts a time
inconsistent policy.
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